My team, the SF Giants, are currently in line to get either the 13th or 14th pick in the 2020 June Draft. Gints fans will remember that the team made deals at the trade deadline, but they were kind of push. The team sold on a couple of relievers, but also made trades designed to help the team going forward in 2019. The Gints still had an outside shot at making the play-offs at the trade deadline, and they play in a market large enough to make total rebuilds relatively expensive.
Is it worth tanking, at least once the team has realized it has no reasonable chance of making the post-season, in order to get a higher selection in the next MLB draft?
I looked at the first twelve draft picks from the June drafts starting with 1987 (the first year the June draft was the only MLB amateur draft conducted for the year) through 2009 (which is long enough ago that we should now know whether the players drafted were major league success stories). Suffice it say, with the first 12 draft picks of each June draft, the team imagines it has drafted a future major league star in compensation for sucking ass the previous season.
In order to keep things simple, I used baseball reference’s career WAR totals to determine whether each drafted player was a major league success. Not precise, I’ll admit, since what drafting teams really care about is the first six-plus major league seasons of control. However, I don’t know how to create a computer program to figure out the years-of-control WAR for each drafted player, and I’m not sure I’d be willing to spend the time to do so even if I knew how. Career WAR seems a close enough approximation.
Also, for purposes of my study, no player is considered to have lower than a 0 career WAR — you cannot convince me that a drafted player who never reaches the majors is worth more than a drafted player who played in the majors but had a negative career WAR. A player reaches and plays in the majors 9 times out of 10 because he is the best player available at that moment to take the available roster spot. The tenth time, he is worth trying to develop as a major league player because of his potential upside.
As a result, I did not bother with averages. Instead, I looked at median performances (i.e., for the 23 players picked at each of the first 12 draft slots during the relevant period, 11 players had a higher career WAR and 11 players had a lower career WAR than the median player.
Also, if a player was drafted more than once in the top 12, because he didn’t sign the first time drafted, I still counted him as his career WAR for each time he was drafted.
Here we go:
1st Overall Pick. Median player: Ben McDonald (1989, 20.8 Career WAR). Best Players drafted with the No. 1 pick: Alex Rodriguez (1993, 117.8 career WAR); Chipper Jones (1990, 85.3 WAR); Ken Griffey, Jr. (1987, 83.8 WAR). Odds of drafting a 15+ WAR player = 61%. [Examples of 15+ WAR players are Mike Lieberthal (15.3 WAR); Gavin Floyd (15.6 WAR); Eric Hosmer (15.7+ WAR); and Phil Nevin (15.9 WAR).] Odds of drafting a 10+ WAR player = 65%. [Examples of 10+ WAR players are Rocco Baldelli (10.2 WAR); Shawn Estes (10.4 WAR); Todd Walker (10.5 WAR) ; and Doug Glanville (10.9 WAR).] Odds of drafting a 5+ WAR player = 70%. [Examples of 5+ WAR players are John Patterson (5.0 WAR); Mike Pelfrey (5.3 WAR); Billy Koch (5.4 WAR); and Sean Burroughs (5.5 WAR).]
2nd Overall Pick. Median player: Dustin Ackley (2009, 8.1 WAR). Best Players drafted with the No. 2 pick: Justin Verlander (2004, 70.8+ WAR); J.D. Drew (1997, 44.9 WAR). Odds of drafting a 15+ WAR player = 35%. Odds of drafting a 10+ WAR player = 43%. Odds of drafting a 5+ WAR player = 70%.
3rd Overall Pick. Median player: Philip Humber (2004, 0.9 WAR). Best Players drafted at No. 3: Evan Longoria (2006, 54.2+ WAR); Troy Glaus (1997, 38.0 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 22%. 10+ WAR player = 35%. 5+ WAR player = 43%.
4th Overall Pick. Median player: Tim Stauffer (2003, 3.8 WAR). Best Players drafted at No. 4: Ryan Zimmerman (2005, 37.7+ WAR); Alex Fernandez (1990, 28.4 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 17%. 10+ WAR player = 26%. 5+ WAR player = 39%.
5th Overall Pick. Median player: zero value. Best players drafted at No. 5: Mark Teixeira (2001, 51.8 WAR); Ryan Braun (2005, 47.7+ WAR). 15+ WAR player = 30%. 10+ WAR player = 35%. 5+ WAR player = 39%.
6th Overall Pick. Median player: zero value. Best players drafted at No. 6: Derek Jeter (1992, 72.6 WAR); Zack Greinke (2002, 71.3+ WAR). 15+ WAR player = 9%. 10+ WAR player = 13%. 5+ WAR player = 26%.
7th Overall Pick. Median player: Calvin Murray (1992, 2.1 WAR). Best players drafted at No. 7: Frank Thomas (1989, 73.9 WAR); Clayton Kershaw (2006, 67.6+ WAR). 15+ WAR player = 30%. 10+ WAR player = 39%. 5+ WAR player = 48%.
8th Overall Pick. Median player: zero value. Best players drafted at No. 8: Todd Helton (1995, 61.2 WAR); Jim Abbott (1988, 19.6 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 13%. 10+ WAR player = 26%. 5+ WAR player = 39%.
9th Overall Pick. Median player: Aaron Crow (2008, 2.6 WAR). Best players drafted at No. 9: Kevin Appier (1987, 54.5 WAR); Barry Zito (1999, 31.9 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 26%. 10+ WAR player = 26%. 5+ WAR player = 48%.
10th Overall Pick. Median player: Michael Tucker (1992, 8.1 WAR). Best players drafted at No. 10: Robin Ventura (1988, 56.1 WAR); Eric Chavez (1996, 37.5 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 39%. 10+ WAR player = 48%. 5+ WAR player = 52%.
11th Overall Pick. Median player: Lee Tinsley (1987, 1.7 WAR). Best players drafted at No. 11: Max Scherzer (2006, 60.5+ WAR); Andrew McCutchen (2005, 43.6+ WAR). 15+ WAR player = 13%. 10+ WAR player = 17%. 5+ WAR player = 22%.
12th Overall Pick. Median player: Bobby Seay (1996, 3.0 WAR). Best players drafted at No. 12: Nomar Garciaparra (1994, 44.2 WAR); Jared Weaver (2004, 34.4 WAR). 15+ WAR player = 26%. 10+ WAR player = 39%. 5+ WAR player = 48%.
What do I conclude from all of the above number-crunching and name-dropping (and my cursory review of the Nos. 13-15 draft picks during the relevant period)? It’s worth tanking to get the first or second pick in the June Draft or to get one of the top ten picks. Since teams bad enough at the trade deadline to have a reasonable shot to get the No. 1 or 2 picks will be tanking no matter what, the only real lesson is that teams that have the 11th to 15th worst record in MLB approaching the trade deadline and realize they have no reasonable shot to make the post-season should SELL, SELL, SELL in order to get one of the top ten draft picks the next June.
The second lesson I take from my study is that teams should ALWAYS draft the player they think to be the best available/remaining if they have a top 12 or 15 draft pick and PAY what it takes to sign the player, unless the potential draftee has made it clear he will not sign with the team under any circumstances. After the two best players in any given draft, there is too much uncertainty for teams not to draft the player they think is the best available. Drafting a player the team thinks is a lesser player in order to save $2 million to throw at a high school player drafted in the 11th round is going to be a bad decision in most cases, particularly in the current regime where teams get a finite budget to sign their first ten draft picks, and the draftees know the cap amounts.
I see no obvious difference in the results for the third through tenth rounds, because, I assume, after the first two consensus best players in any given draft, teams have different opinions about the merits of the next, larger group of potential draftees, to the point where it more or less becomes a crap shoot. After the first two rounds, and with the notable exception of the 10th round, the median player drafted with the third through 12th pick isn’t really worth a damn, and the odds of selecting a 15+ WAR player, a true star, are considerably less than one in three.
As a final note, I don’t like the fact that post-trade-deadline waiver deals can no longer be made. I don’t see the downside in allowing losing teams to dump their over-paid veterans after the trade deadline (but before the Sept. 1st play-off eligibility deadline) in exchange for some, usually limited, salary relief and prospects, while play-off bound teams get to add veterans so they can put the best possible team on the field come play-off time. I hope MLB can find a way for these deals to resume in the future.